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TONINO GRIFFERO(Università di Roma Tor Vergata)
WHO’S AFRAID OF ATMOSPHERES
(AND OF THEIR AUTHORITY)?
The authority of atmospheresWe entered this haven through a wicket-gate, and were disgorged by anintroductory passage into a melancholy little square that looked to melike a flat burying-ground. I thought it had the most dismal trees in it,and the most dismal sparrows, and the most dismal cats, and the mostdismal houses (in number half a dozen or so), that I had ever seen. Ithought the windows of the sets of chambers into which those houseswere divided were in every stage of dilapidated blind and curtain, crip-pled flower-pot, cracked glass, dusty decay, and miserable makeshift;while To Let, To Let, To Let, glared at me from empty rooms, as if no newwretches ever came there, and the vengeance of the soul of Barnardwere being slowly appeased by the gradual suicide of the present occu-pants and their unholy interment under the gravel. A frowzy mourningof soot and smoke attired this forlorn creation of Barnard, and it hadstrewn ashes on its head, and was undergoing penance and humiliationas a mere dust-hole. Thus far my sense of sight; while dry rot and wet rotand all the silent rots that rot in neglected roof and cellar, – rot of rat andmouse and bug and coaching-stables near at hand besides – addressedthemselves faintly to my sense of smell, and moaned, ‘Try Barnard's Mix-ture’.1It is hard not to be affected by the effect of this (gloomy) literaryatmosphere. It is even harder to regard the ‘emotionally impreg-nated’ space2 it outlines as the mere subjective projection of an ill-disposed perceiver. Or even worse to ‘reduce’ the spatial perceptto a constellation of factors so de-axiologised and devoid of signifi-cance that they could be perceived in the most diverse ways3. The
1 C. Dickens, Great expectations: the first edition, 1861, vol. 2, Cambridge, Cambridge Uni-versity Press, 2011, pp. 22-23.2 E. Blum, Atmosphäre. Hypothesen zum Prozess der räumlichen Wahrnehmung, Baden,Lars Müller Publishers, 2010, pp. 244-249.3 Each affective-qualitative element perceived in an external world completely devoid oftertiary qualities and inhabited only by quantifiable and material dimensions (primaryqualities), by neutral data waiting to receive some kind of meaning and to be integrated
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authority of the atmospheric space does depend, like that ofspeech acts, on certain necessary contextual requirements − beingin a church as tourists, waiting for the bus to take us elsewhere, isvery different from being there as believers waiting for a true en-counter with God4 − but in other cases it is violently imposed overthe perceiver, completely reorienting her emotional situation andproving wholly refractory to any relatively conscious attempt at aprojective adaptation. Be it serene or tense, relaxed or oppressive,smoky or airy, formal or informal, etc., an atmosphere still posses-ses and exercises authority or authoritativeness5. This is becausean atmosphere that I feel externally − i.e. as poured out into thesurrounding space6 and even in the entire biosphere (think of theunsettling atmosphere of terrorism or of the financial crisis) − ismine not because I possess it (possessive sense of the pronoun),but because it concerns me (subjectivising sense of the pronoun).Atmospheres concern us, despite having the fleeting and ephem-eral existence typical of quasi-things, which come and go, so thatwe cannot sensibly ask ourselves, as Schmitz often says, wherethey are when we do not perceive them7.The authority of atmospheric feelings − more stable and per-formative than a social norm or a thought8, but less so than the
with theoretical constructs of statistical-prognostic value, would necessarily be illusory,i.e. an unconscious projection of a psychic element (of the inner world).4 J. Patzelt Werner, Stimmung, Atmosphäre, Milieu. Eine ethnomethodologische Analyse
ihrer Konstruktion und Reproduktion, in S. Debus - R. Posner (hrsg.), Atmosphären im
Alltag. Über ihre Erzeugung und Wirkung, Bonn, Psychiatrie-Verlag, 2007, pp. 196-232,here pp. 196-197.5 As Hermann Schmitz repeats on many occasions (for a first approach in Italian to hisNew Phenomenology see T. Griffero, Come ci si sente qui e ora? La ‘Nuova Fenomenologia’
di Hermann Schmitz, in H. Schmitz, Nuova Fenomenologia. Un’introduzione, ed by T. Grif-fero, Milano, Christian Marinotti, 2011, pp. 5-23).6 Schmitz takes this position to an extreme: asserting that a landscape could not be saidto be delightful if all people were depressed is the same as stating that in the absence ofhumans and animals endowed with sight colours would no longer exist (H. Schmitz, Was
ist Neue Phänomenologie?, Rostock, Koch, 2003, p. 201).7 T. Griffero, Quasi-cose che spariscono e ritornano, senza che però si possa domandare
dove siano state nel frattempo. Appunti per un’estetica-ontologia delle atmosfere, in T.Griffero - A. Somaini (a cura di), «Rivista di Estetica» 33 (2006), 3, pp. 45-68; Id., Quasi-
cose. La realtà dei sentimenti, Milano, Bruno Mondadori, 2013; Id., Soffia dove vuole: il
vento e altre quasi-cose, in M. Rotili - M. Tedeschini (a cura di), Cose (Sensibilia 6-2012),Milano, Mimesis, 2013, pp. 189-212.8 A. Blume - C. Demmerling, Gefühle als Atmosphären. Zur Gefühlstheorie von Hermann
Schmitz, in H. Landweer (hrsg.), Gefühle. Struktur und Funktion, Berlin, Akademie Verlag,2007, pp. 113-133, here p. 127.
195 Lebenswelt, 4.1 (2014)
evidence of a state of affairs9 due to its less homogeneous diffu-sion − can be traced back to a sort of prestige or ‘force’ that con-strains and enthralls, almost in the manner of an automatism10,even in the absence of physical coercion11. It may take various for-ms and not just the three ones listed by Schmitz (legal, moral andreligious). It is a normativity that, of course, is not so much dis-creet but rather loosely diffused into a situation; and yet it is ableto inhibit any critical distance in those who come across it, espe-cially if unexpectedly12, as they become involved in the script (or‘story’13) it predisposes. The angst-inducing atmosphere produ-ced, for example, by the ubiquity of breaking news predisposesthose who are enmeshed by it to see enemies everywhere14 or atleast to overestimate the dangers of the outside world. By not re-ducing communication to an anodyne and to some extent control-lable exchange of information, atmospherology15 should then pro-perly evaluate the overall performative, illocutionary and perlocu-
9 H. Schmitz, Die Legitimierbarkeit von Macht, in H.J. Wendel - S. Kluck (hrsg.), Zur Legi-
timierbarkeit von Macht, Freiburg - München, Alber, 2008, pp. 5-19, here p. 8. Which isprobably no more cognitive than affective, implying an immediate experience of theprimitive presence and the coercion to accept the state of affairs as a ‘fact’.10 A force that instead, in the case of the atmosphere of love, is based on constraints thatare always relatively vague and, in any case, neither too tight nor too loose (H. Schmitz,
Die Legitimierbarkeit von Macht cit., pp. 11-12).11 Hence the recurring mistake, a true refugium ignorantiae, of seeing a kind of sorceryin it (B. Carnevali, Le apparenze sociali. Una filosofia del prestigio, Bologna, Il Mulino,2012, pp. 100-103).12 T. Griffero, Alle strette. L’atmosferico tra inatteso e superattese, in P. Cavalieri - M. LaForgia - M.I. Marozza (eds.), L’ordinarietà dell’inatteso, «Atque» 10 (2012), Bergamo,Moretti & Vitali, pp. 101-127.13 W. Schapp, In Geschichten verstrickt. Zum Sein von Mensch und Ding (1953), Vorw. vonH. Lübbe, Frankfurt a. M., Klostermann, 2004.14 «The software of new conflicts is given by information and media design and −	as	a	result Design governance
und breaking news: das Mediendesign der permanenten Katastrophe, in C. Heibach (hrsg.),
Atmosphären. Dimensionen eines diffusen Phänomens, München, Fink, 2012, pp. 285-303,here p. 301).15 G. Böhme, Atmosphäre. Essays zur neuen Ästhetik, Frankfurt a. M., Suhrkamp, 1995; Id.,
Anmutungen. Über das Atmosphärische, Ostfildern v. Stuttgart, Tertium, 1998; Id., Aisthe-
tik. Vorlesungen über Ästhetik als allgemeine Wahrnehmungslehre, München, WilhelmFink Verlag, 2001; Id., Architektur und Atmosphäre, München, Fink, 2006; Id., L’atmosfera
come concetto fondamentale di una nuova estetica, in T. Griffero - A. Somaini (a cura di),
op. cit., pp. 5-24; T. Griffero, Atmosferologia. Estetica degli spazi emozionali, Roma - Bari,Laterza, 2010; Id., Atmospheres. Aesthetics of emotional spaces, Farnham, Ashgate, 2014).
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tionary effect not only of language16, but in general of all forms ofexpression, even if merely mental17.
The model (or prejudice?) of the numinousBut to make an atmospheric feeling into a binding authoritywould perhaps imply the transformation of phenomenology intotheology. In fact, is not precisely the ‘numinous’ − described byRudolf Otto (and before that by Shaftesbury), i.e. an author explic-itly preferred to Husserl − the model of Schmitz’s conception of at-mospheres? In fact, the atmospheric feeling − at least the prototy-pical one, which is marked as involuntary vital experience by in-gression and discrepancy18 − does not only resemble the (Schlei-ermacherian) feeling of ‘dependence’19, but also the mysterium
tremendum. The numinous is both disturbing (primus in orbe deos
fecit timor!) and fascinating in its corporeal resonance (shudder,goose bumps, ecstasy, etc.); we cannot exhaustively identify itsfoundation, since empirical phenomena are not its cause but onlyits occasional stimulus, nor we can have a notional intelligence ofit20. Similarly, the atmosphere manifests its own authority or maj-esty, it often attracts and repels as if it were the sublime and,while not being something absolutely other, it generates in thosewho are gripped by it a creatural feeling, a «depreciation of thesubject»21 and of their own profanity that leads them to an affec-tive submission22. But above all, as mysterium tremendum majes-
16 G. Böhme, Atmosphären in zwischenmenschlicher Kommunikation, in S. Debus - R. Pos-ner (hrsg.), op. cit., pp. 281-293, here pp. 282-283.17 Think of the conditioning due to so-called ‘mental images’ (individual and/or collec-tive), ‘catchy’ melodies and rhythms, or suggestive names of places and people.18 T. Griffero, Atmosferologia cit., pp. 137-138; Id., Quasi-cose cit., p. 40.19 Here we shall prescind from the anti psychologistic objections made against Schleier-macher by Otto.20 R. Otto, The idea of the holy: an inquiry into the non-rational factor in the idea of the
divine and its relation to the rational (1917), tr. by J.W. Harvey, Oxford, Oxford UniversityPress, 1936.21 Ibid., p. 11.22 «In every highly-developed religion the appreciation of moral obligation and duty,ranking as a claim of the deity upon man, has been developed side by side with the reli-gious feeling itself. None the less a profoundly humble and heartfelt recognition of theholy may occur in particular experiences without being always or definitely charged orinfused with the Hense of moral demands. The holy will then be recognized as thatwhich commands our respect, as that whose real value is to be acknowledged inwardly.It is not that the awe of holiness is itself simply fear in face of what is absolutely over-powering, before which there is no alternative to blind, awe-struck obedience. Tu solus
sanctus is rather a paean of praise, which, so far from being merely a faltering confession
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tas, augustum, energicum, fascinans, the numinous is demandingand sentimental without being either psychological in the subjec-tivist sense or a ‘you’ that can be encountered − as it happened inthe subsequent realization of it in personal divinities (even differ-entiated by gender in historical religions). Similarly, atmosphereis contagious, in some respects bound to emotionally specificplaces23 and binding without being a projection of the perceiver.Indeed, the similarities are many. Summarizing: just like thenuminous, every atmosphere is a) the more deeply felt, and in a
way known, the less it is linguistically circumscribable24; b) gen-erable but not rationally communicable; c) engaging for the felt-body with consequences on the physical body (it is ‘hair-raising’,it makes your ‘limbs tremble’, it gives you ‘goose bumps’, etc.); d)contagious, because «like stored-up electricity, [it] discharg[es]itself upon any one who comes too near»25; e) attractive not inspite of the fact that it terrifies but because of it; f) superveningwith respect to sense data that are merely its occasio26; g) finally,especially active on emotionally predisposed minds, since «im-pression [...] presupposes something capable of receiving impres-
of the divine supremacy, recognizes and extols a value, precious beyond all conceiving»(ibid., pp. 53-54).23 Following Seneca (Letters to Lucilius, 43, 1), who acknowledged that the divine isnaturally suggested by thick woods, lonely places and dense shadows, Otto (op. cit., pp.12-13; my emphasis) can state what follows: «Let us follow [this feeling] up with everyeffort of sympathy and imaginative intuition wherever it is to be found, in the lives ofthose around us, in sudden, strong ebullitions of personal piety and the frames of mindsuch ebullitions evince, in the fixed and ordered solemnities of rites and liturgies, andagain in the atmosphere that clings to old religious monuments and buildings, to templesand to churches [...]. The feeling of it may at times come sweeping like a gentle tide, per-vading the mind with a tranquil mood of deepest worship. It may pass over into a moreset and lasting attitude of the soul, continuing, as it were, thrillingly vibrant and reso-nant, until at last it dies away and the soul resumes its profane, non-religious mood ofeveryday experience».24 «Revelation does not mean a mere passing over into the intelligible and comprehensi-ble. Something may be profoundly and intimately known in feeling for the bliss it bringsor the agitation it produces, and yet the understanding may find no concept for it. Toknow and to understand conceptually are two different things, are often even mutuallyexclusive and contrasted. The mysterious obscurity of the numen is by no means tanta-mount to unknowableness» (ibid., 139).25 Ibid., p. 18.26 «It does not arise out of them, but only by their means. They are the incitement, thestimulus, and the occasion for the numinous experience to become astir, and, in sodoing, to begin at first with a naive immediacy of reaction to be interfused and interwo-ven with the present world of sensuous experience» (ibid., p. 117).
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sions, and that is just what the mind is not, if in itself it is only a
tabula rasa»27.And the fact that the holy is «an experience of determinedatmospheres»28, perhaps second in intensity only to the erotic29,seems to be confirmed by the proto-Christian notion of holy spirit,considered − prior to its dogmatisation and crystallization in theform of the third person30, and still today by minor communities(mystical, Quakers, pietism, etc.) − as the epiphany of an externalfeeling31 that, according to St. Paul, contends for the lived body ofman against an opposite atmosphere (the flesh). It is a dynamisticand externalist model present in the archaic Greek world, forwhich feelings, and especially the religious ones, were notoriouslynot internal but external to the subject. Such model is applied hereto the holy spirit-pneuma as neither individual person nor prop-erty interior to those who are gripped by it, but it also applies tothe values (mens, pietas, virtus, fides) understood by the most an-cient Roman culture not as inner virtues but as objective powers,as well as to any other conception of feeling as a daemonic posses-sion (from the Dionysian onwards). This model, which was over-come by the subsequent concretisation of the divine − required bythe dialogic character of human beings −	and	by	the	‘invention’ offeatures such as omnipresence, perfection and soteriological cer-tainty (which make the divine into a more controllable and man-ageable partner), survives in modern Europe, according to
27 Ibid., p. 164. «Like all other primal psychical elements, [the holy] emerges in duecourse in the developing life of human mind and spirit and is thenceforward simplypresent. Of course it can only emerge if and when certain conditions are fulfilled, condi-tions involving a proper development of the bodily organs and the other powers of men-tal and emotional life in general, a due growth in suggestibility and spontaneity and res-ponsiveness to external impressions and internal experiences. But such conditions areno more than conditions; they are not its causes or constituent elements» (ibid., p. 128,my emphasis).28 J. Soentgen, Die verdeckte Wirklichkeit. Einführung in die Neue Phänomenologie von
Hermann Schmitz, Bonn, Bouvier, 1998, p. 90).29 See G. Rappe (Archaische Leiberfahrung. Der Leib in der frühgriechischen Philosophie
und in außereuropäischen Kulturen, Berlin, Akademie Verlag, 1995, for a summary seepp. 312-323).30 For the proto-Christian, already prepared to the not fully personal objectivity of feel-ing by the Old Testament idea of divine wrath that permeates everything, it must haveseemed entirely plausible to conceive the divine as an impersonal power (1 Jn, 4, 18) −	hence the subsequent resistance to accept the personalisation of the spirit in the Trinity(H. Schmitz, Atmosphäre und Gefühl. Für eine Neue Phänomenologie, in C. Heibach (hrsg.),
op. cit., pp. 39-56, here p. 55) −	that	is,	as	an	atmosphere.31 «No one has ever seen God; but if we love one another, God lives in us and his love ismade complete in us» (1 Jn, 4, 12).
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Schmitz, only in the so-called voice of conscience, in the Kantianmoral law as numen (true ‘fact of reason’).The notion of atmosphere, at least the prototypical (Schmitz-ian) one, is therefore certainly indebted to that of the divine as nu-minous and genius loci, as precisely the local condensation of anatmosphere32, but it is so only in the sense that it shares not somuch its absolute necessity but rather its absolute accidentalityand its undeductibility from other phenomena. The divine − thederivation of Yahweh from the Egyptian god-wind Amun and theclimatic origin of many religious beliefs are probably true33 −blows where and when it wants, impregnating a certain humanspace and appearing more as a transient predicative concept orappellative (‘here is god’ would only mean ‘divine event’) than asthe name of a stable entity which is subject to predicates. In thesame way, the atmospheric feeling is such because, being theepiphany of an impersonal external force, it pervades a certainspace (lived, anisotropic and yet pre-dimensional)34 so intenselythat it wins every critical resistance and ability of abstraction. Theatmosphere is therefore ‘divine’ in this context only as it is resis-tant to a critical distance that, however, is always possible: in con-trast to what is implied by the traditional theological notion of au-thority, in the case of atmospheres the corporeal and emotionalinvolvement (effect) can indeed deny its cause (which is not atransmission of essence here), or at least, discussing it, mitigate itsstrength. The ‘divinity’ of atmospheres also involves a merely lo-cal authority, often only temporary, related to a certain commu-nity or even to a single person, and it is so hard to plan35 that I in-
32 «Local divine atmospheres are part of the immense realm of supra-personal and ob-jective feelings, which partly exist [...], like weather, without a place and simply, so tospeak, ‘in the air’, or more precisely in the space of vastness; and which are partly alsocondensed in determined places and around certain objects, often only as fleeting evoca-tions» (H. Schmitz, System der Philosophie, Bd. III: Der Raum, 4, Teil: Das Göttliche und
der Raum, Bonn, Bouvier, 1977, p. 133). See C. Norberg-Schulz, Genius loci. Landschaft,
Lebensraum (1979), Stuttgart, Klett-Cotta, 1991; R.J. Kozljaniĉ, Der Geist eines Ortes. Kul-
turgeschichte und Phänomenologie des genius loci, 2 voll., München, Albunea Verlag,2004; T. Griffero, Atmosferologia cit., pp. 79-81.33 See H. Schmitz, System der Philosophie cit., p. 149; Id., Der unerschöpfliche Gegenstand.
Grundzüge der Philosophie, Bonn, Bouvier, 1990 (20073), p. 439.34 Il ritorno dello spazio (vissuto), in M. Di Monte - M. Rotili (a cura di), Spazio fisico-
spazio vissuto (Sensibilia 3-2009), Milano, Mimesis, 2010, pp. 207-239.35 Even Phillip Gröning’s film, Into great silence (2005), set in the monastery of theGrand Chartreuse in the French Alps (Huppertz), rather than generating a religious at-mosphere through various means (silent spaces extraneous to the historical time, lightthat is conducive to recollection, characters without a socio-biographical identity almost
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vite those who have not experienced numinous moments − and,although with some differences, atmospheric ones either − «toread no further»36.Then, far from relegating the issue of ‘power’ and the au-thority legitimating it to sociology, or even worse to the physicalsciences, we should ask ourselves, paraphrasing Kant, if the pri-vate and collective emotional life is not more easily explained bythe (anti-introjectionistic) hypothesis that feelings are not inter-nal properties (attributes-accidents) of the psychological subject,but stable entities − external and aggressive in a way that acci-dents surely cannot be!37 − around which the subject has to re-volve, conditions that are ‘in the air’ and that are powerfully activeupon the lived body without it being necessary to anthropomor-phise them or metaphysicalise them in the form of ‘values’38.
Authority, intensity, depthNow that we have spoken of the peculiar ‘divinity’ of atmospheres(in the strict sense of the numinous)39, it is necessary to specifytheir authority. Being legitimate, even with socially relevant re-percussions (marginalization in the first place), only prescindingfrom physical coercion40, the authority of an atmosphere – whe-ther it is a percept or the horizon within which we perceive some-thing (in the intransitive sense in which ‘it is the tone that makesthe music’)41 − is such because it implicitly claims an absolute va-
ahead of otherworldly depersonalisation, almost hypnotic practices aimed at the gener-ation of transformational psychic conditions), simply sets up a condition of possibilitythat is necessary (but not sufficient).36 R. Otto, op. cit., p. 8.37 It is unlikely «to be raptured by mere accidents»! (H. Schmitz, System der Philosophie,Bd. III: Der Gefühlsraum, 2, Bonn, Bouvier, 1969, p. 406).38 Which in turn could be a positivistic surrogate not so much of the metaphysical (asHeidegger means) but rather of the atmospheric (H. Schmitz, Was ist Neue Phänomeno-
logie?, Rostock, Koch, 2003, p. 310).39 See H. Schmitz, System der Philosophie cit., p. 91: «an atmosphere, whether it is a feel-ing (or a constellation of feelings), is divine, as a gripping power, when its authority hasan unconditional seriousness for those who are gripped by it».40 This does not exclude, however, that authority may also lie in physical force.41 See J.-P. Thibaud, Die sinnliche Umwelt von Städten. Zum Verständnis urbaner Atmos-
phären, in M. Hauskeller (hrsg.), Die Kunst der Wahrnehmung. Beiträge zu einer Philoso-
phie der sinnlichen Erkenntnis, Zug - Schweiz, Die Graue Edition, 2003, pp. 280-297, herep. 293; M. Bockemühl, Atmosphären sehen. Ästhetische Wahrnehmung als Praxis, in Z.Mahayni (hrsg.), Neue Ästhetik. Das Atmosphärische und die Kunst, München, Fink, 2002,pp. 203-222, here p. 221; E. Minkowski, Vers une cosmologie: fragments philosophiques,Paris, Aubier Montaigne, 1936, p. 234; see also the doubts expressed by V. Mühleis,
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lidity and thus inhibits, at least in principle, any real possibility ofchoice and reaction in the perceiver.Unlike socio-political authority, however, atmospheric au-thority does not always presuppose its own acknowledgement,much less a self-aware one, appearing mostly in the form of lightand shade and with a variable intensity. This explains why no onecan force me to feel it from the outside: atmospheres, in fact, existin the proper sense, except for their more or less successful plan-ning, only in act, as actual facts and not factual facts42 − that is,only when we sense their authority. They may exercise authorityover the presence, in contrast to what the dead (cause) exerts onthe living (its effect)43, only if they are involuntarily (mnestically)reactivated in the present44 (à la Proust), or, symbolically, intraces of the present (as in every millenarianism, even secular). Ifan atmosphere that here and now does not oppress anyone is cer-tainly not oppressive, we could still sense the authority of atmos-pheres that do not capture us or that, as sub-atmospheres, lose inthe interaction with other sub-atmospheres equally willing to oc-cupy the entire space of the lived presence. Sometimes45 the out-sider, rather than disturbing the socio-cultural milieu or disregar-ding its expectations, acts as if he ‘felt’ the same atmosphere, thuscontributing to its preservation and to the process of reflexivityneeded in each construction of reality, yet without fully recogniz-ing its authority.Just as socio-political authority may not have spontaneouslygenerated itself, but might have simply been transmitted (as in thecase of officials) from a more autonomous authority, so atmos-pheric authority is often not the one (to use Schmitz’s terminol-ogy) exerted by the anchor point, which is what is authenticallyresponsible for the atmosphere, but the progressively weakenedone of its condensation points: this is why oftentimes the atmos-phere of anguish, properly ‘caused’, for example, only by the painof a dental visit, is overcome by an atmosphere that is condensed
Kunst und Atmosphäre, in S. Debus - R. Posner (hrsg.), op. cit., pp. 124-140, here pp. 130,136.42 Thus G. Böhme, Aisthetik cit., referring to J. Albers, Interaction of color. Die Grundle-
gung einer Didaktik des Sehens, Köln, Dumont, 1975. E. Blum, op. cit., p. 130, also distin-guishes between matters of concern and matters of fact.43 A. Kojève, The notion of authority (2004), London, Verso, 2013, p. 41.44 It does not seem possible to decide to undergo once again the authority of a dissolvedatmosphere.45 J. Patzelt Werner, op. cit., p. 211.
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into what is associated with it (even the magazines in the waitingroom) and whose authority, yet, is no less powerful.Also, unlike political authority − which is more easily pre-served «if the people who have to endure it know what must bedone to keep it (and see that it is actually done, of course)»46 − theauthority of atmospheric feelings presupposes the non-total dis-solution of the pre-reflective and shaded state it springs out of.Undermined by disenchantment47 and irony, by even small gaffesand wrong tones and even more so by suspicion (‘the emperor hasno clothes’), the atmospheric feeling does not always survive cog-nitive penetrability. And if an engaging feeling, for example theatmosphere of grief at the funeral of a loved one, is not scratchedby the cognitive level (by the fact that we ‘know’ that we all shalldie), the atmospheric detection is instead affected − it is a totallydifferent cognitive element − by the full understanding of its gen-erative conditions, just as a fully explained persuasive techniqueceases to be such.Things are different in the case of an atmosphere that is notin contrast with a kind of knowledge but that was generated by it(this perspective, however, is very different from the unfortu-nately yet uninvestigated persuasive atmosphere of thought):knowing that an object in itself anonymous was owned by a pres-tigious person makes us see it ipso facto as an ecstatic object, ca-pable of removing the homogeneity of the surrounding spacethanks to its emotional and symbolic ‘volume’, able to arouse spe-cial attention and reverence due not so much to fully awareknowledge but rather to suggestions unintentionally borrowedfrom ‘cognitive archives’ and ‘sentimental archives’ that are any-thing but systematic48. In short: we know that what grips us is anatmosphere, but it cannot be ‘reduced’ to a concept. Nor is it nec-essary for such knowledge to be truthful, since the atmosphere,co-produced by its phenomenic appearance and by the thought ofit (or by acting in it)49 according to the model of Kantian ‘freeplay’, can receive an effectual contribution also by non-knowledge(the charm of the indecipherable) and false knowledge50.
46 A. Kojève, op. cit., p. 110.47 G. Böhme, Atmosphären in zwischenmenschlicher Kommunikation cit., pp. 289-290.48 E. Blum, op. cit., p. 66.49 For example, slow motion in cinema is atmospherically revealing (ibid., pp. 214-216).50 Ibid., pp. 14, 35.
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There is authority −	it	is	right	− only where there is a changein those who react51. But in the case of atmospheres it is not at allnecessary to suppose a free and conscious agent, as often the (pre-linguistic, pre-reflexive) condition of our actions, its base tonality(Damasio’s background emotions?) − unconsciously perceivedand sometimes even misunderstood (it seemed as mere anxietyand instead it was love!) − turns out to be more powerfully at-mospheric than the direct irradiation of this or that subject52. It isonly essential that the atmospheric pre-condition is sufficientlyintense, or rather, deep.But we need to rethink this depth beyond the verticalitytypical of Western topics (from Plato to psychoanalysis)53 and inthe light of the neo-phenomenological externalisation of the affec-tive. This ‘depth’ would then be a property not of the soul of theperceiver, but of what appears54, and perhaps it would be explain-able − referring to a tradition that goes from the eighteenth cen-tury to the twentieth century Gestalt psychology − through itsability to generate mixed feelings. Mendelssohn for example ex-plains the pleasure for the negative by saying that, when you putthe object at a distance (here is the link with the sublime), everyperformance is satisfactory for the subject because it is an af-firmative predicate of it and because it is intuitive knowledge ofaffirmative characters of the object. It follows that mixed feelingsare not as immediately rewarding as those that are only delecta-ble, but they are also not as monotonous and, in the long run, nau-seating: in fact they are capable of «penetrating deeper into themind and appear to sustain themselves there longer [...]. The un-pleasant mixed with the pleasant captures our attention, and pre-vents us from being prematurely sated»55. Consequently greaterauthority is held by an atmospheric feeling whose overall qualityis not only Gestaltically irreducible to its components, but alsodeep as it is ‘mixed’.
51 A. Kojève, op. cit., p. 19.52 G. Böhme, Atmosphären in zwischenmenschlicher Kommunikation cit., p. 288.53 B. Meyer-Sickendiek, Gefühlstiefen: Aktuelle Perspektiven einer vergessenen Dimension
der Emotionsforschung, in G. Lehnert (hrsg.), Raum und Gefühl. Der Spatial Turn und die
neue Emotionsforschung, Bielenfeld, Transcript, 2011, pp. 26-48.54 Schmitz perhaps juxtaposes too much depth and breadth (System der Philosophie cit.,p. 337).55 M. Mendelssohn, Moses Mendelssohn: philosophical writings (1761), ed. by D.O. Dahl-strom, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 143.
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Flat and shallow moods always have a somewhat monotonous direction[...] on the contrary all deep feelings have within themselves a polyvocaldirection. And the deepest oppositions of the soul seem to agree withoutexception on immediately reunifying at the same time the starkest con-trasts of feeling inside them.56Since the pleasure/pain distinction invests only the most periph-eral states of existence57, the most authoritative atmosphere mi-ght therefore not be the unilateral one but the ‘mixed’ one, bothbecause it is discrepant compared to the state of mind of the per-ceiver and because it is able to induce the perceiver to completeits overall tonality even in the absence of further adumbrations.Whether atmospheric effectiveness is ‘naturally’ inherent toa certain space, or it was absorbed by it over time maybe as a re-sult of a functional planning, it still presupposes an empathicallypredisposed and in a sense ‘sociologically’ competent perceiver,that is, someone able to recognize in the atmospheric potential agenerator of lifestyles and collective feelings: it is enough for us toexclude here that an atmosphere can be arbitrarily generated ordeclassified to a contingent and totally subjective emotion.
Emotional gamesThe most common temptation is certainly that of explaining theexternality and authority of atmospheres by referring to «cultur-ally determined emotional norms»58 embodied in the situation tothe point of causing us to be subordinated to the feeling we get orheterosense59. The socially desirable trend to adjust our own feel-ings (form of perception) to the one we encounter (content of per-ception), especially if it is unexpected60, explains much but noteverything. It does not explain, for example, if not through fancifulanthropomorphic hypotheses, the authority of climatic and natu-ralistic atmospheres, nor the corporeal resonance of any atmos-
56 F. Krueger, Zur Philosophie und Psychologie der Ganzheit, Berlin, Springer, 1953, p.191.57 M. Scheler, Schriften zur Soziologie und Weltanschauungslehre, Bern - München,Francke, 1963, p. 46.58 C. Demmerling, Gefühle, Sprache und Intersubjektivität. Überlegungen zum Atmosphä-
renbegriff der neuen Phänomenologie, in K. Andermann - U. Eberlein (hrsg.), Gefühle als
Atmosphären. Neue Phänomenologie und philosophische Emotionstheorie, Berlin, Akade-mie Verlag, 2011, pp. 43-55, here p. 48.59 A. Blume - C. Demmerling, op. cit., p. 126.60 M. Hauskeller, Atmosphären erleben. Philosophische Untersuchungen zur Sinneswahr-
nehmung, Berlin, Akademie Verlag, 1995, p. 22.
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phere. This clearly shows that conventionality perhaps does nottotally rule out the suddenly binding character of atmospheres(for a traditionalist a convention has also an aura of authority!),but it does not do full justice to it, at least not in the prototypicalones (discrepancy).Then the binding authority of an atmosphere, such as ameadow that we might call, not at all metaphorically61, ‘happy’,does not come from a subjectivist-fictional inference (it is as if thelawn was happy...), but rather from the effect of resonance of thepercept (that meadow) in the perceiver, who feels this atmos-pheric authority in his Leib but (Schmitz reports this on many oc-casions) as not originating from it. This authority may take manyforms, such as the pedagogical one, which, in hindsight, is neces-sarily based on all its choices (communicative forms, spaces, ritu-als, etc.) on pathic affordances addressed to the learner’s felt-bo-dy62; but also that of vicarious shame63, whose atmosphere evenconditions − and certainly not empathically, as there is no shamein the shameless64 − the detached observer and his physiognomic-gestural (contractive, in the broadest sense) conduct.An example very dear to Schmitz is that of the cheerful per-son who, encountering a sad person (who is so for ‘serious’ rea-sons), tends not to encourage her to recover her lost dignity, as ifthis person was merely tired, but − at least initially, and providedthat he has adequate sensitivity − he tends to mitigate or com-pletely conceal his own joy in order to respect the privacy of theother. This is because the atmospheric sadness radiated by peopleor things − very differently from a kind of exhaustion whose pos-sible atmospheric character would still be spatially restricted65 −
61 T. Griffero, Atmosfere: non metafore ma quasi-cose, in E. Gagliasso - G. Frezza (a curadi), Metafore del vivente. Linguaggi e ricerca scientifica tra filosofia, bios e psiche, Milano,Angeli, 2008, pp. 123-131.62 K. Schultheis, Macht und Erziehung. Überlegungen zur pathisch-leiblichen Dimension
pädagogischen Handelns, in H.J. Wendel - S. Kluck (hrsg.), Zur Legitimierbarkeit von
Macht, cit., pp. 99-115.63 T. Griffero, Vergognarsi di, per, con… Le atmosfere della vergogna, in E. Antonelli - M.Rotili (a cura di), La vergogna. The shame (Sensibilia 5-2011), Milano, Mimesis, 2012, pp.161-190; Id., Lo strano caso del pudore (vicario) e della sua atmosfera, in E. Guglielminet-ti (ed.), Pudore, «Spazio Filosofico» 2 (2012), V, pp. 153-162; Id., Quasi-cose. La realtà dei
sentimenti cit., pp. 89-108).64 And when mistakenly judging the sentiment of others as more intense than it is, wecan even perceive the authority of «a feeling that is not felt by anyone» (M. Hauskeller,
op. cit., p. 23).65 H. Schmitz, Die Legitimierbarkeit von Macht cit., p. 9.
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has more authority than atmospheric joy66, it «claims entirely andexclusively for itself the space of lived presence and, with the do-minance of this authority, it represses to various degrees the at-mosphere of joy, which is just as prone to the endless invasion ofthe lived presence»67. That is why the sad person normally feelsmore legitimated than the cheerful person to sink, sometimeseven to the point of pathetic self-satisfaction, into the atmospherethat surrounds him and that he radiates; and he does not only feelan intense atmospheric contrast when he comes across a joyfulatmosphere, whence the worsening of his sadness, but he alsofeels entitled to more or less explicitly protest against what he re-gards as the unjustified (unfair?) happiness of others68.Thus, in their confrontational game, the atmospheric feelingsinherently endowed with greater authority prevail. It may be thevanity of things perceived in a cold winter morning or in an ano-nymous non-place, which is able to inhibit, respectively, someonewho confidently opens the window and someone starting with thebest hopes. But it can also be, symbolically, the solemn gravitythat impresses one who enters a church for superficiality or ani-mated by the worst intentions (the holy), or the accused convin-ced of being smarter than the court called upon to judge him (thelaw). It may be the wrath that persecutes, sometimes to the pointof paranoia, those who feels a strong sense of guilt for their ac-tions, or the mutual trust felt by those who ‘breathe’ it as being ir-reducible to the logic of giving and trying to get something back. Itmay be, finally, the binding authority of the atmosphere of love: itis no coincidence that it justifies at least part of the crazy thingsone does ‘for love’, and it also arouses in those who not recipro-cate such feeling a certain respect for those who are caught by it.
66 Id.,Was ist Neue Phänomenologie? cit., pp. 47-48.67 Id., Nuova Fenomenologia cit., 2011, p. 102.68 A contrast of feelings that, unlike Hauskeller (op. cit., p. 23) and Demmerling (op. cit.,p. 47), Schmitz does not attribute to the simple corporeal motions (otherwise a tiredperson would become perky for the sole reason of meeting energetic and volitionalpeople), but that he explains by calling to witness the pleasure for the others’ misfor-tunes (or vice versa). H. Schmitz - G. Marx - A. Moldzio, Begriffene Erfahrung. Beiträge
zur antireduktionistischen Phänomenologie, Rostock, Koch, 2002, pp. 70-71). Schmitzand his critics underestimate, however, the case of syntony: a sad person among the sadis in fact often less sad, and a happy person among other happy people is a little lesshappy (and not only due to a superficial spirit of distinction).
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More ethics…?Whether the authority of an atmosphere is, to use Weber’s catego-ries, legal (I feel I must respect the atmosphere of the courtroom),traditional (I overpay an ancient book for the aura that surroundsit) or charismatic (I am unilaterally corporeally influenced by anenvironment or a person), it is often called ‘irrational’ just becau-se we ignore the general mechanisms of corporeal communica-tion69, namely, the way in which an atmospheric feeling, suggest-ing a rule (broadly understood) to be respected, fascinates theperceiver, keeps him in check, raptures him (an intoxicating fra-grance, a spark that catches the eye, soft skin that causes us tostroke it). In this case, the greatest charismatic suggestion wouldbe featured by an atmosphere that blends unembodiment and uni-lateral embodiment, thus taking away from the passivated partnerher personal distress and transferring to her the distress of thedominant partner instead, reaching an almost narcotic effect70.Such dispossession causes the recipient to ‘sink’ into the perceptand ‘fixate herself’ on the issue imposed on her, and perhaps jux-taposes atmospheric authority71 to the (Hegelian) authority of thelord over the bondsman.While doubting that from a good definition of (atmospheric)authority one can «infer the way in which we must act upon manand men in order to be able to both generate an Authority, andkeep it» (Kojève), we shall begin by distinguishing absolute autho-rity, which cannot be resisted, and relative authority, whose cen-tripetal direction one can resist by appealing to a higher level ofpersonal emancipation. For example, one can feel wrapped up inshame on a level, but at the same time transcend this atmosphereon a higher level, for instance by regarding that shame as the re-sult of mere convention; likewise one may feel gripped by a de-featist atmosphere but still manage to transcend it because of arecent personal success (Schmitz). But absolute and relative are inturn (historically and culturally) relative, depending on the givencorporeal and biographical situation − in a word, on the level of
69 According to H. Schmitz, Charisma, in H. Becker (hrsg.), Zugang zu Menschen. Ange-
wandte Philosophie in zehn Berufsfeldern, Freiburg - München, Alber, 2013, pp. 100-109,here p. 101, they are provided mainly by the motor suggestions and the synaestheticcharacters inherent especially to the eyes and the voice.70 Ibid. p. 106.71 If we really were to adopt the four pure types of authority described by Kojeve, theywould be: father-son, master-servant, leader-band, judge.
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personal emancipation of the subject involved 72 − so that, evenwhile being very close, two people might perceive totally differentatmospheres (for example, they might or might not feel ashamed),but this does not necessarily entail the unreality of such atmos-pheres: they would be no less real than a toothache had by onlyone of the two, or than the same language spoken in a relativelydifferent way by the two.But the very admission that it is possible, if not to totally ab-stract oneself from involving situations (as evidenced by Hegel)73,at least to achieve a certain distancing from an atmosphere which,for that very reason, perhaps does not even ‘become’ a real feel-ing74, suggests that we should say something about the ethicalconsequences of this ‘atmospherologic’ approach. And not just be-cause, since the (religious, ethical, aesthetic, ontological, legal) au-thority is a claim that, after careful checking, we feel we cannotlight-heartedly avoid without feeling guilty, we must recognizethat the legal norm is really a norm75 only if it rests on the author-ity of legal feelings. We are referring to the specific pathos ofwrath76 and shame (depending on whether, outraged by the injus-tice, one feels in the right or in the wrong): two feelings whose le-galization, which aims to prevent unregulated consequences (re-
72 Which aesthetic sensibility also pertains to: the melancholic atmosphere of a rainylandscape appears relatively less melancholic in the artistic mediation (H. Schmitz, Situ-
ationen und Konstellationen. Wider die Ideologie totaler Vernetzung, Freiburg - München,Alber, 2005, p. 289). But the relationship between the two levels of atmospheric power−	 hence	 the	 paradox	 that	 makes	 the	 museum	 into	 a	 device	 that	 both	 removes	 aura	(transformation of an originally religious authority into a ‘solely’ artistic authority) andconfers it (transfer of value and therefore aesthetic authority to banal everyday objects)−	deserves	much	further	investigation.73 Through self-consciousness, everyone might «find in himself the ability to abstract
himself from all […] and in this way prove himself able to set every content within him-self» (G.W.F. Hegel, Philosophy of right (1821), New York, Dover Publications, 2005, pp.xxxi, my emphasis).74 «When the gripping is authentic, he who is caught must first of all be in solidarity withthe feeling and accept it in its own momentum; only later can he be personally con-fronted with the sentiment, surrendering to it or resisting it» (H. Schmitz, Atmosphäre
und Gefühl cit., p. 45). Hence the possibility, usually excluded at the outset in the field ofpolitical science, of authority over the self: in this case, instead, it is exercised by a partof the self (involvement) over another, refractory part of the self (the previous state ofmind but also more rational reflection).75 Beyond inadequate positivist theories (theory of values, natural law) or consensualtheories (discourse ethics) of the sources of law (H. Schmitz, Das Reich der Normen,Freiburg - München, Alber, 2012, pp. 41-49).76 It is not by chance that in cultures that are not legally normed one tends to respectwrath (of the wronged person), which is obviously considered endowed with excep-tional authority.
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taliation and suicide), forms the so-called legal sensitivity77. Thesefeelings are as such the emotional and corporeal foundation of thewhole social life (especially of the idea of duty)78 − a foundationunderestimated only because it is previously controlled by anethical constellation of pre-feelings79.The ethical-political problem is also caused not only by thesocial but also climatic (environmental issue) and medial (ma-nipulation) ubiquity of the atmospheric phenomenon80, and thenby the interference between ‘natural’ or background atmospheresand the intentionally generated ones, between sub-atmospheresof different content and qualities and so on. And, last but not least,by the fact that if «people never shape their conduct upon theteaching of pure reason»81 but through impressions, vague remi-niscences, easily translatable ideas − in short through seductiveimages that public personae and active subjects try to control,wherever possible, in order to «cultivate the sensorium which isthe basis of all unity and all consensus»82 − much in politics de-pends precisely on the ‘climate’83 that one is able to arouse.But wouldn’t we then be running the risk of irresponsibly in-dulging in the atmosphere? Of becoming a mere appendage to it,as some fear about the Internet and the navigable space that it‘contains’84? Obviously what has been said so far on atmosphericauthority takes a relatively different shape depending on whetheratmospheres are understood as objective daemonic powers − ex-ternal to man, unintended, with respect to which the subjectivecomponent is reduced to the more or less critical reaction of theperceiver (prototypical atmospheres) − or as an external and ob-
77 Jesus’ solution (Jh, 7, 53-8, 11: «He that is without sin among you, let him first cast astone at her») is different, as it turns the wrath towards the guilty, demanding venge-ance, into collective shame (H. Schmitz,Was ist Neue Phänomenologie? cit., p. 302).78 Id., Situationen und Konstellationen cit., p. 242.79 For example, it is by pre-feeling the atmosphere of outrage that would cause our out-burst that we avoid to cross Michael Kohlhaas type of road without exit.80 Welcoming the (by no means exhaustive) distinction between physical, social andmedial atmosphere (C. Heibach, Einleitung, in Id. (hrsg.), op. cit., p. 11).81 G. Le Bon, Psychology of crowds (1895), Cardiff, Sparkling Books, 2009, p. 15.82 B. Carnevali, op. cit., p. 88.83 We might speak, in general, of a ‘climatic pleroma’ or ‘third subtle’ (climate, Stimmung,
milieu, Umwelt, even expression, etc.), that, because of its non-objectual and non-informative nature, is unrecognized by modern European rationalism (P. Sloterdijk,
Anthropisches Klima, in C. Heibach (hrsg.), op. cit., pp. 27-37, here pp. 28-29).84 S. Günzel, Vor dem Affekt: di Aktion. Emotion und Raumbild, in G. Lehnert (hrsg.), op.
cit., p. 67.
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jective effect but of a relationship, implicit as may be, betweensubject and object (derived atmospheres), or again as idiosyn-cratic moods, subjective and projective (spurious atmospheres).At the heart of the matter, we find the polite but firm disputebetween Hermann Schmitz and Gernot Böhme85: does the increas-ingly pervasive and seductive ‘aesthetic work’ (cosmetics, furni-ture, urban planning, lighting, fashion, set design, etc.) directly ge-nerate an atmosphere − or at least the phenomenic conditions ofpossibility86 of a physiognomic-expressive ‘aesthaticness’ that ap-plies to atmospheres as well as things – or does it merely exercisea «technique of impression» (object of investigation of an unspeci-fied «technology of impression»)87, which is very different fromthe ordinary climatic, seasonal, collective, housing feelings, etc.,i.e. situations (not things, at most quasi-things88) that by theirchaotic multiplicity are not things that can be generated by singleevents and things?Now, while suggesting that there may be non-atmosphericsituations89 and belying the deadly illusion of being able to gener-ate any feeling, Schmitz’s choice to circumscribe the atmosphericphenomenon also generates some doubts as to whether some-thing that, as required by the model of the numinous, basicallydepends on the observer’s mere moving can really claim absoluteauthority. What’s more, in the light of the anti-dualistic and anti-informationist model of a corporeal communication that acts as anunanalyzable impressing situation often even without anchorpoints, it entails that it is impossible to explain manipulation (tra-ditionally) in terms of moral responsibility (of what manipulates)and guilty loss of self-determination (of the manipulated)90.The clear demarcation between transcendent-abyssal atmo-spheres and tricky situations as ‘suggestive’ condensations (Pla-
85 H. Werhahn, Die Neue Phänomenologie und ihre Themen, Rostock, Koch, 2003, p. 79-81.86 G. Böhme, Atmosphäre cit., pp. 199-200.87 H. Schmitz, Situationen und Atmosphären. Zur Ästhetik und Ontologie bei Gernot Böhme,in M. Hauskeller - C. Rehmann-Sutter - G. Schiemann (hrsg.), Naturerkenntnis und Natur-
sein. Für Gernot Böhme, Frankfurt a. M., Suhrkamp, 1998, pp. 176-190, here pp. 181-182.88 Ibid., p. 188.89 What if (Mt, 12, 44-45) the room was occupied by even worse and more numerousspirits (see H. Wehrhahn, op. cit., p. 80)?90 C. Heibach, Manipulative Atmosphären. Zwischen unmittelbarem Erleben und medialer
Konstruktion, in Id. (hrsg.), Atmosphären. Dimensionen eines diffusen Phänomens, Mün-chen, Fink, 2012, pp. 261-282, here p. 263.
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katsituationen) perhaps dangerously ‘centered’ in some charisma-tic individual91 − Hitlerian state holidays, the extreme version ofthose during the French Revolution, advertising and contempora-ry aesthetic work (now devoid of any social normativity)92 − cer-tainly has the merit of warning one against the instrumental andrhetoric administration of one’s affections. Yet, such demarcationis and will remain problematic as such. Both because in history,unfortunately, charismatic propaganda in totalitarian regimes canbe exchanged for absolute (and, in this sense, divine) authority,and because no one is ever involved in an atmosphere that one
knows to be manipulated (such acknowledgement is only made ex
post and often only in the third person)93. And also both becauseovercoming the dualism of subject/object involves the collabora-tion (not far-fetched, but radically excluded by Schmitz) of themanipulated himself in the genesis of the atmosphere, and be-cause the Schmitzian primacy of presence seems to underestimatethe (sometimes not timely but delayed) nature of the atmosphericexperience, perhaps even conceivable as a ‘compromise solution’with respect to the traumatic effect of the initial discrepancy.Finally, it is needless to remember that the manipulative (ina non-judgmental sense: persuasive) appearance is obviously im-plicit in every practice that generates an atmosphere, much as theillusory appearance (which is such, besides, only in relation to adifferent and incommensurable level of ‘reality’) and the parasiticexploitation by the condensation points (charismatic character orsuggestive situation) of atmospheric feelings that are more au-thentic and widely disseminated.a) And yet it is only by acquiring a better atmospheric ‘com-petence’, not reducible solely to the affectus non nisi parendo vinci-
tur, that we can really learn how not to be grossly manipulated.How to reserve for us, where this is not given by the authority it-self (in its best examples), a space for critical reflection of our own− even more so when, as in today’s globalised world, we must bedisenchanted about more and more dangerously anonymous au-thorities94 (from the ‘stock market’ to GDP to credit SPREAD, etc.).
91 H. Schmitz - G. Marx - A. Moldzio, op. cit., p. 169.92 The only exception admitted by Schmitz in this trivial ‘smelling’ (aesthetic) atmos-pheres is dwelling as cultivation of feelings in an enclosed space (home, church, garden,Japanese tea house, etc.).93 For a few suggestions see C. Heibach, Manipulative Atmosphären cit., p. 263.94 H. Schmitz, Die Legitimierbarkeit von Macht cit., pp. 15-16.
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b) But if this competence – the duly secularized «ability todistinguish between spirits» (1 Cor. 12,10), as it were − mitigatesthe objection that in such determinism95 man would be «a blindpassenger of atmospheres»96, still it does not entail easy illusionsabout full emotional transparency or about the availability of anArchimedean point less fallible than personal critical sense97. Asin contemporary culture there is no privileged place for aware-ness, maybe we will have to settle for the interaction of the mostdiverse experiences (spatial, medial, functional, etc.), withoutclaiming a critical position superior and/or external to them98,promoting on an emotional level a kind of ‘separation of (atmos-pheric) powers’ that is healthy for mental life. For example, by re-learning from the most artificial atmospheres – e.g., from the coldand procedural ones of democracy99 − what the peculiarities ofthe most natural ones are, and vice versa.c) Just as the experience of trompe-l’oeil and ‘immersive’spaces relies on the fact that an immersive phase will be followedby a partly emotional and partly reflective phase of emersion, soan atmosphere is poorly manipulative when it stimulates this se-quence, when the ‘I’ that it calls upon is neither a wholly non-reflective subject − and maybe tasteless enough to appreciate onlythe atmospheric character of clichés (such as a blue and clear sky)− nor a subject placed at an excessive contemplative distance100.Provided, of course, that such coexistence of affective and corpo-real involvement and relatively self-reflective detachment can bedemonstrated.
95 Schmitz overestimates the immediacy of feelings (despite their status nascendi) andthe automatic gestural consequences of gripping (often one is immediately certain offeeling something, but one does not know what it is!). Besides, this is simplistically ex-plained as a relationship between servant (perceiver) and master (feeling), thus under-estimating not only the ambiguity of feelings but also the active role of the subject intheir very creation (see J. Soentgen, op. cit., p. 112).96 Ibid., p. 117.97 H. Schmitz, Was ist Neue Phänomenologie? cit., p. 328; Id., Die Legitimierbarkeit von
Macht cit., p. 14.98 L. Bieger, Ästhetik der Immersion. Wenn Räume wollen. Immersive Erleben als Raumer-
leben, in G. Lehnert (hrsg.), op. cit., pp. 75-95, here pp. 88-89.99 T. Griffero, Come foglie al vento? Osservazioni sull’atmosfera politica, in P. D’Angelo - E.Franzini - G. Lombardo - S. Tedesco (a cura di), Costellazioni estetiche. Dalla storia alla
neoestetica. Studi offerti in onore di Luigi Russo, Milano, Guerini, 2013, pp. 216-223.100 M. Diaconu, Wetter, Welten, Wirkungen. Sinnverschiebungen der Atmosphäre, in C.Heibach (hrsg.), op. cit., pp. 85-99, here p. 88.
213 Lebenswelt, 4.1 (2014)
As already mentioned, the authority of atmospheres exists inthe proper sense only when it overcomes all the critical scruplesthat the perceiver may mobilise, when it prevails over his resis-tance and he cannot access a further critical level. That is, whenreflection does not weaken the suggestion of the numinous, of thevoice of moral conscience (secularised residue of the divine) or ofthe appeal to do what we feel is right: this is perhaps the atmos-pheric-binding sense, that can be hardly overestimated in a hope-fully shocking philosophical revaluation of suffering101, includingthe Lutheran famous statement ‘Here I stand. I cannot do other-wise’.
101 T. Griffero, Quasi-cose cit., pp. 75-87.
